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Abstract
Futures thinking is a field rich in a wide range of tools and techniques. 
Of these, scenario development has perhaps the most potential 
to assist future-focused policy development. This article seeks to 
stimulate discussion and inform practice in New Zealand, first, by 
exploring the history of scenarios, and second, by investigating a 
past scenario development process which sought to guide national 
health policy.
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for the quality of its long-term decision 
making (Boston, Bagnall and Barry, 
2019). There is also a forum, coordinated 
by Inland Revenue, for the public sector to 
build capability and apply the discipline 
of futures thinking. A substantial report 
from the non-governmental sector has 
recommended a Future Generations Act to 
sit above a new (environmentally focused) 
Futures Commission, a National Futures 
Strategy and a Futures Group of officials 
to provide integrated advice to ministers 
and Cabinet (Severinsen, 2019). The field 
of futures thinking appears to be making 
a comeback, after a history in which its 
fortunes have ebbed and flowed (Menzies, 
2018).
This is a field rich in a wide range of 
tools and techniques. Among others, the 
Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet website lists horizon scanning, the 
futures wheel, scenarios, backcasting, the 
Delphi technique, cross impact matrix, 
causal layered analysis and visioning.
Of these, by far the most widely used in 
the US government have been horizon 
2020 is a significant year for futures thinking (aka foresighting) 
in the New Zealand public sector. Inevitable 
references to ‘2020 vision’ aside, new state 
sector legislation includes a requirement 
for long-term sector statements. The 
Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet has compiled a set of futures 
thinking resources and tools, and explained 
the benefits of their use (Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2019). A substantial report, prepared in 
collaboration with the Office of the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives, aims to 
help make government more accountable 
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scanning/trend analysis and scenarios 
(Greenblott et al., 2019). Practically, it is 
difficult to separate these two, as the former 
is an essential input to the latter. In New 
Zealand, future scenarios have been 
developed in health (Krieble and Middleton, 
1997), tourism (Yeoman, 2008), retirement 
income policy (Boven and Grace, 2013) and 
the transport sector (Ministry of Transport, 
2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016, 2017, 2019, n.d.), 
and for the future of work (Productivity 
Commission, 2019).1 The OECD has also 
provided guidance on the use of scenarios 
(OECD, n.d.).
The scenario technique has the 
potential to contribute much to future-
focused policy development, but there is 
considerable variability in its application 
and impact (Volkery and Ribeiro, 2009). 
This article aims to stimulate discussion 
and help inform practice in New Zealand 
by, first, exploring the history of scenarios, 
and second, by reviewing and learning 
from a past scenario development process 
which sought to guide national health 
policy. We conclude by recommending that 
scenarios be considered for use across 
different areas of public policy, particularly 
where there are seemingly intractable 
problems or different positions are highly 
polarised. 
A short history of scenarios
The lineage of scenarios has been 
consistently traced back to its beginnings 
after the Second World War (e.g. Amer, 
Daim and Jetter, 2013; Millett, 2003; 
Varum and Melo, 2010). Herman Kahn 
is generally regarded as the ‘father’ of 
the scenario, particularly in the United 
States. Kahn defined a scenario as ‘a set 
of hypothetical events set in the future 
constructed to clarify a possible chain 
of causal events as well as their decision 
points’ (Amer, Daim and Jetter, 2013). He 
developed geopolitical scenarios to help 
understand the strategic implications and 
possible outcomes for a world which for 
the first time contained several nuclear-
armed powers. 
Pierre Wack built on Kahn’s ideas to 
introduce scenarios to the corporate sphere 
(Wack, 1985a, 1985b), particularly the Shell 
Oil Company, which famously used 
scenarios to anticipate the various oil crises 
of the early 1970s and to come through 
those in better shape than did competitors. 
Members of the team at Shell went on to 
become proponents of the scenario 
technique (Schwartz, 1991, 1996; Van der 
Heijden, 1996), as did other thinkers and 
writers such as Schoemaker (1995). 
In his often-cited papers, Wack (1985a, 
1985b) outlined issues that still resonate 
today. Unlike forecasts, which managers 
rely upon to be accurate guides to decision 
making, scenarios reflect an inherently 
uncertain future. Wack thought that 
organisations that could not quickly adapt 
would die. What was required was not so 
much new ways of planning as new ways 
of managerial thinking (Wack coined the 
phrase ‘the gentle art of reperceiving’). 
Scenarios were means for changing 
thinking, and for communication.
Strategies are the product of a worldview. 
When the world changes, managers need 
to share some common view of the new 
world. Otherwise, decentralized strategic 
decisions will result in management 
anarchy. Scenarios express and 
communicate this common view, a 
shared understanding of the new realities 
to all parts of the organization. (Wack, 
1985a) 
From the perspective of today, it might 
be assumed that the best way to ensure 
connection with and between scenarios 
and managers, and to achieve ‘gentle 
reperceiving’, would be to use highly 
participatory processes. However, later 
analysis of Wack’s writings (Chermack and 
Coons, 2015) shows that he thought 
scenario planning as a group process was 
a ‘dangerous trap’ which led to ‘regression 
to the mean’ or conventional, mediocre 
thinking.2 He favoured instead an approach 
based on workshops as a form of group 
interviewing, providing input to expert 
developers who would follow up with 
stunning presentations to win decision 
makers’ support. Wack did see side benefits 
from group processes, such as team 
building, group dialogue and the sharing 
of mental models. But to him the primary 
purpose of scenarios was to change the way 
decision makers saw the world, so that they 
would act with a wider, more informed 
point of view. The world is a ‘noisy’ place 
and Wack (1985b) quotes Roberta 
Wohlstetter (1962):
to discriminate significant sounds 
against this background of noise, one 
has to be listening for something or for 
one of several things ... one needs not 
only an ear but a variety of hypotheses 
that guide observation. 
Scenarios provide these hypotheses or 
mental maps3 that enable heightened 
sensitivity to the signals that are important 
(Schoemaker, 1993). Schoemaker describes 
the theory, practice and methodology that 
underpin scenarios. To him, scenarios are 
Hegelian in their underlying philosophical 
premise (the method courts contradiction 
and paradox), in contrast to the Liebnizian 
approaches of traditional decision analysis 
and forecasting which seeks a single truth 
and representation of reality.
The gist of the scenario method seems 
that it is many things: art and science, 
deduction and induction, structured and 
fluid, rational (in the unitary actor sense) 
and political. These multiple facets have 
caused it to remain elusive and fuzzy by 
academic standards. Nonetheless, the use 
of scenarios in strategic management is 
real, important and growing (ibid.)
Acceptance of scenarios is influenced 
by source credibility (i.e. who developed 
them), content credibility (what they 
say) and channel credibility (by whom 
and how they are presented).
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There is also value in thinking about 
change in whole systems rather than as a 
series of policy projects. Scenarios prompt 
thinking about systems as a counter to the 
reduction of complex dynamic systems to 
linear logic models ‘inculcated with closed 
system concepts, categories and catechisms 
that are the bedrock of the project design 
mentality’ (Patton, 2019).
Futures thinking developed in parallel 
in other parts of the world. By the late 
1950s, Gaston Berger had established the 
French school of prospective thinking, 
which emphasised preparation for multiple 
futures to unfold – leading in turn to an 
insight that good planning spurs action 
that changes the present in preparation for 
the future (Durance, 2010; Spaniol and 
Rowland, 2018). Berger’s work in the 
French school of futures thinking was 
carried on by Michel Godet (1982), among 
others. The work of Bernard de Jouvenel 
(1967) was also of seminal importance, 
while on the other side of the English 
Channel the concept of ‘foresight’ in this 
context was derived as a counterpoint to 
the ‘hindsight’ gained from retrospective 
studies of how technological innovations 
had come about (Martin, 2010).
Definitions, criteria and benefits
Schoemaker defined scenarios as ‘focused 
descriptions of fundamentally different 
futures presented in coherent script-like 
or narrative fashion’ (Schoemaker, 1993). 
If scenarios are presented as possibilities, 
rather than firm predictions, they become 
psychologically less threatening to those 
holding different world views. Acceptance 
of scenarios is influenced by source 
credibility (i.e. who developed them), 
content credibility (what they say) and 
channel credibility (by whom and how 
they are presented). Schoemaker differs 
from Wack in arguing that the scenario-
building process should not be entirely 
entrusted to an intellectual elite.
Other useful criteria for measuring the 
quality of scenarios are included in another 
paper, which also provides a practical guide 
to their development (Schoemaker, 1995): 
scenarios should be relevant, internally 
consistent and archetypal (i.e. describe 
generically different futures rather than 
variations on one theme). Ideally, each 
scenario should also describe an 
equilibrium or a state in which the system 
might exist for some length of time, as 
opposed to being highly transient. 
Unusually among early writers, Schoemaker 
addressed the question of ‘do scenarios 
work?’, albeit narrowly, by attempting to 
measure impact on sales.
Although more criteria have been 
offered by which the quality or effectiveness 
of scenarios might be measured (Amer, 
Daim and Jetter, 2013; Cairn et al., 2006; 
Coates, 2000), very few attempts have been 
made to evaluate quality, outcome or 
impact of scenarios (Varum and Melo, 
2010; Wright, Bradfield and Cairns, 2013). 
One exception in the corporate sector 
found that future-prepared firms 
outperformed the average on growth and 
profitability (Rohrbeck and Kum, 2018). 
A significant barrier to evaluation may 
be that foresight is considered more of a 
consulting field than an academic one, so 
that not much work is public and even less 
makes it into journals for review or citation. 
Foresight ‘is closer to management and 
financial consulting where practices are 
judged by the market as accepted without 
formal evaluation, though this is changing 
as training assessment metrics become the 
norm’ (Gardner and Bishop, 2019).
Futures work challenges assumptions 
and helps us to be more cognisant of 
risks and opportunities. The problem 
with evaluating futures work is that 
once an insight has been accepted it 
seems obvious – at the end of the 
process it all looks obvious even though 
it did not at the start. (Jackson, 2019)4
This quotation from Jackson is a nice 
description of ‘hindsight bias’.
Nonetheless, the use of scenarios has 
continued to increase (Amer, Daim and 
Jetter, 2013), which begs the questions ‘why 
is that?’ and ‘how are scenarios being 
developed and used?’ It may be that the 
evolution of corporate forms and increasing 
complexity of decision making creates the 
need for more, nuanced sources of 
information and insight (Scharmer, 2007), 
and scenarios fit the bill. Quantification is 
still important, but for some people 
scenario-based narratives, metaphors and 
visual approaches such as causal maps are 
often easier to relate to, absorb and 
communicate than are lists of facts and 
trends contained in conventional reports.
Process
Mostly, emphasis seems to be placed on 
participatory processes, team building 
and organisational learning (Cairns et al., 
2006; Coates, 2000; Millett, 2003; Varum 
and Melo, 2010). However, Durance and 
Godet distinguish between
scenario (processes) which are highly 
confidential and used exclusively by 
executive managers and those which are 
used as a tool for group process in order 
to mobilize the collective intelligence 
of an organization faced with a rapidly 
evolving external environment. These 
latter studies are highly focused on the 
communication of strategy as a central 
objective; whereas with the former, 
foresight is specifically used for 
developing enterprise strategy. 
(Durance and Godet, 2010)
This duality of purpose and ‘access’ to 
the fruits of scenarios is reprised to some 
extent by Varum and Melo (2010) and 
echoes Wack’s apparent ‘elitist’ view of 
process (Chermack and Coons, 2015). 
From scenarios’ early beginnings there 
have been debates about the technique 
which continue in the present day. The 
term scenario planning has become less 
favoured (notwithstanding the view of 
The term scenario planning has become 
less favoured ... because it suggests a 
mechanistic or deterministic view more 
associated with forecasting. 
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human agency implied by prospective 
thinking) because it suggests a mechanistic 
or deterministic view more associated with 
forecasting. Integrating scenarios with 
strategic planning has also remained 
problematic.
There continue to be different views as 
to whether scenarios should be descriptive 
of possible futures or normative, i.e. paint 
pictures of one or more desirable futures 
(more akin to visions of the future). An 
associated question relates to the purpose 
of scenario development. Is it to derive 
‘correct’ or ‘accurate’ scenarios, in which 
case an exhaustive set of steps and much 
testing may be required, or is it the process 
itself that is most important? Proponents 
of the latter view hold that in the long term 
accuracy is impossible and the process is 
more important because it builds 
understanding of futures issues, contributes 
to shared learning, challenges conventional 
wisdom and opens up minds to alternative 
(likely better) strategies that would 
otherwise be overlooked; in which case, 
diversity of input becomes more important 
since it allows a broader range of inputs 
and the opening up of more minds. 
Learning from history
The recognition that our world is 
developing more quickly and less 
predictably is not new. As noted in the 
introduction, there have been several 
recent attempts to respond to uncertainty 
through the use of scenarios. However, a 
rare earlier example of a health scenario 
exercise, undertaken in 1997, offers an 
opportunity to learn about the usefulness 
of the technique from the standpoint of 
the future that was being considered more 
than 20 years ago.
The health sector is affected by both 
relatively predictable trends, such as the 
ageing of the population and the increase 
in lifestyle-associated health risks and 
diseases, and the more uncertain effects of 
technological change and differences in 
access to health resources. In 1997 the New 
Zealand health system was coming to the 
end of a decade of radical change and still 
faced a challenging future. To help galvanise 
some futures thinking, the then Institute 
of Policy Studies at Victoria University of 
Wellington conducted a series of workshops 
about potential long-term futures for New 
Zealand’s health sector. From those 
workshops was compiled a summary 
report entitled Health Futures: 2020 visions 
(Krieble and Middleton, 1997), which 
contained five scenarios for 2020 and 
proposed itself as a starting point for the 
development of a vision ‘of what a diverse 
society may want (from its health system) 
and how the future may be influenced’. The 
five scenarios were:
1. Muddling Through: ad hoc adjustments 
to current challenges. In this scenario, 
steady economic growth has fuelled 
advances in information and 
intervention technologies; however, the 
gap between available resources and 
consumer expectations has grown. New 
approaches to delivering services co-
exist with traditional structures.
2. A Technocrat’s Dream: a technically 
highly tuned and less politicised version 
of the present system. Here, funding 
levels have kept pace with demographic 
and economic growth and significant 
capital injections have been made to get 
key technological advances off the 
ground.
3. Two Tiers: a two-tier system brought 
about by policy gridlock (described in 
the report as a scenario unlikely to 
appeal to those within the health sector 
but which others outside might 
choose). The two tiers are represented 
by a publicly funded health service 
which mainly provides an accident and 
emergency service and basic public 
health, while insurance firms provide 
care for those who can afford it.
4. Power to the People: a reframed health 
concept, resulting in partnerships 
across professions and the public, and 
across local and central government 
sectors. With parallels to the Gaia 
archetypal image of the future where 
becoming more and more inclusive is 
what is important (Inayatullah, 2008), 
this scenario envisions the merger of 
economic and social policy into a single 
public policy, leading to solutions to 
problems that looked insolvable two 
decades earlier. 
5. Positively Private and Global: a system 
driven by the introduction of private 
healthcare plans. Domestic health plans 
trade on being locally responsive, while 
overseas plans offer economies of scale 
and competitive prices. The state has 
redefined its role in health to insurance 
regulation and wider national health 
matters.
Given that we are now in a future whose 
possibilities were being imagined over two 
decades ago, a high-level evaluation, 
drawing heavily on hindsight, has 
investigated how useful these scenarios 
were to decision makers. The results are 
reported in full in Menzies and Middleton 
(2019). What follows is a summary of what 
was done and the conclusions that were 
drawn.
Evaluating the 1997 scenarios from the 
perspective of 2020 
To develop the 1997 scenarios a series of 
workshops was held, involving 28 people 
(including the current authors)5 from 
government, business, academia and parts 
of the health service. Participants were 
provided with a background document 
which described a range of drivers of 
change, based on health policy literature, 
New Zealand health policy documents 
and health futures exercises in Australia, 
the United Kingdom and United States. 
Information on demographic and social 
trends (for example, changing family 
structures and dependency ratios as a 
result of an ageing population) were 
included in the background paper, as 
were epidemiological trends, including, 
In 1997 the New Zealand health system 
was coming to the end of a decade 
of radical change and still faced a 
challenging future.
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for example, the potential for an increase 
in infectious disease as a result of antibiotic 
resistance and low socio-economic status. 
With the assistance of decision support 
software, participants ranked and sorted 
the likely magnitude and impact of these 
and other drivers. The final scenarios were 
then drafted, focusing on those drivers 
and values where participants collectively 
thought there was the most uncertainty 
in how a response might play out. What 
this meant is that (rightly or wrongly) 
demographic, social and epidemiological 
trends were not viewed as highly uncertain 
but were considered a likely backdrop to 
all the scenarios. Instead, the scenarios 
were differentiated by those drivers and 
values participants thought could have 
widely different trajectories. Health gain, 
fair access, and quality came through as 
the most important values in a future 
health system. The drivers that could be 
increasing in importance, decreasing in 
importance or staying much the same 
included: rationing pressures; information 
technology; research and development; 
efficiency; consumer sovereignty; and 
personal responsibility.
The underlying logic of the 1997 
exercise was that credibly developed 
scenarios would open the minds of decision 
makers to possibilities they would not have 
otherwise considered, leading to better 
decisions, more relevant, resilient strategies 
and better health outcomes for New 
Zealanders. We did not know how much 
this logic was shared by participants, but 
in order to test whether the 1997 scenarios 
did improve longer-term thinking, in 2018 
we used criteria proposed by Schoemaker 
(1993, 1995) as the basis for a high-level 
evaluation.
These criteria were addressed through 
a series of semi-structured interviews with 
five original workshop participants, three 
of whom are still involved in health policy 
at senior levels, and one additional ‘modern 
day equivalent’ (i.e. someone who would 
have been involved had the 1997 process 
been run today) about their views of 
developments in the health sector over the 
last 20 years. The inclusion of people with 
continuous involvement proved useful, 
because they were well equipped to recall 
the state of play in 1997 and developments 
since. The criteria covered:
•	 relevance	(in	relation	to	wider	needs	
and impact on decision makers and 
strategy);
•	 credibility	 (of	 source,	 content	 and	
channel);
•	 coherence	(internal	consistency);
•	 ‘archetypality’	(truly	distinct	from	each	
other);
•	 genuinely	 long	 term	 and	 future-
focused.
The interviews also probed:
•	 What	elements	of	the	scenarios	have	
come to pass?
•	 To	what	degree	were	the	‘signals’	from	
the future recognised?
•	 What	signals	were	missed	altogether?
In order to orientate our work to the same 
shared history of change, we supplemented 
our interviewees’ assessment of the 
underpinning drivers and values that shaped 
each scenario with the relevant literature on 
health policy change since 1997.
Findings
The 1997 scenarios were drafted at a 
time when New Zealand was moving 
away from a conviction that widespread 
structural reforms were going to translate 
seamlessly into improvements. The health 
futures exercise offered an opportunity 
to ‘safely’ explore, outside of entrenched 
ideological positions, what health sector 
change could look like. Interviewees in 
2019 were struck by the ongoing relevance 
of the underpinning drivers and values 
that had shaped each scenario in 1997. 
Combinations of these drivers and values 
had been explored in each scenario to 
present distinctive chains of plausible 
events. Rather than comment solely on the 
plausibility of each scenario, interviewees 
reflected on which of the drivers and values 
continue to dominate discussions on 
health sector change. Below is a summary 
of what was covered. 
Rationing pressures less dominant
A prominent driver across all scenarios was 
rationing pressures. In 1997 considerable 
policy effort was expected to go towards 
managing public expectations, rising 
costs and constrained healthcare budgets. 
Today, rationing pressures continue, but 
interviewees reflected that discourses about 
rationing are not as prominent. A cynical 
view is that there has been a reframing 
and devolution of rationing ‘out of sight’ 
and the country is in denial about this 
still looming issue (Treasury, 2016). In the 
last 20 years the locus of decision making 
moved away from centrally accountable 
health sector agencies to 20 locally based 
district health boards. Interviewees 
pointed out that hard prioritisation calls 
are still being made by these boards, 
but the debate is now shifting towards 
how much New Zealand wants to have 
national consistency in these decisions 
and how much is it prepared to live with 
local variation based on local assessment 
of needs. In part these changes are linked 
to the prevailing political climate, and it is 
worth noting that New Zealand has had 
two different governments of nine years’ 
duration – one centre-left and one centre-
right – since the 1997 exercise.
Primary healthcare noted but underplayed
The pressures of an ageing population 
were clearly foreseeable in 1997, 
prompting concerns about the health 
sector’s ability to cope with chronic 
conditions such as diabetes and ageing-
related neurodegenerative diseases. These 
fears have been realised. Current policy 
attention is being paid to improving long-
term condition management, with a strong 
emphasis on greater responsiveness from 
the primary care sector in managing these 
conditions (Ministry of Health, 2016). 
Looking back on the scenarios, little 
Interviewees in 2019 were struck by the 
ongoing relevance of the underpinning 
drivers and values that had shaped each 
scenario in 1997.
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attention was paid to the distinct role of 
the primary sector in the health system 
in managing chronic conditions. The 
collectivisation of primary care through 
new mid-level organisations representing 
general practice interests was not foreseen, 
though the potential for better integration 
of primary and secondary care services 
due to the spread of larger primary care 
provider organisations was recognised.
Research and development and information 
technology’s continued importance as drivers 
The scenarios also foresaw the potential 
impact of research and development and 
information technology drivers. Under 
the title Research and Development were 
included discoveries expected to assist 
in improving diagnoses, treatment and 
system performance, as well as the potential 
for ethical issues to result. The Technocrat’s 
Dream scenario highlighted the potential 
for better information collection and 
sharing across the sector, including hospital 
booking systems and unique personal 
identifiers. What was underplayed was 
the potential for a digital divide, the social 
processes needed to support technological 
change, and the move towards myriad 
personal information technology systems. 
Calls in the recent New Zealand health 
strategy for ‘smart systems’ (Minister 
of Health, 2016) reflect the long-run 
interest in the gains expected from new 
digital ways of working, but interviewees 
pointed out that much of the potential 
is still unrealised. In particular, concerns 
were raised that current ways of delivering 
health services are not keeping pace with 
consumer expectations, nor efficiently 
leveraging mobile and digital technologies. 
Signals concerning patient-centred care
Early signals of the importance of patient-
centred care were evident in the Power 
to the People scenario. Other important 
ideas concerning the broader concept of 
well-being rather than illness, the socio-
economic determinants of health and the 
importance of consumer empowerment 
were all anticipated. These centred on 
one scenario only but were a weak early 
signal of a set of ideas that have received 
significant health policy attention since 
1997. The introduction of Whänau Ora in 
New Zealand as a philosophy of holistic 
health and development operationalised 
by Mäori providers is one obvious example 
(Boulton and Gifford, 2014). 
Shifting private sector roles
One scenario – Two Tiers – presented 
a health sector in 2020 where New 
Zealanders had given away any desire to 
have a universally accessible public health 
system. This scenario was designed to 
direct attention towards a future to prevent 
rather than aspire to – i.e. a future where 
the state provides an inadequate safety 
net for the uninsured, public confidence 
in the public health system fades and 
policy gridlock prevents progress. The 
arc of health policy change since 1997 has 
avoided this scenario, with policies focused 
on managing a largely state-funded system 
with an emphasis on quality, efficiency 
and responsiveness alongside social 
democratic values (Cheyne, O’Brien and 
Belgrave, 2008). Interviewees suggested 
that the debate about privatisation of the 
health sector and withdrawal of the state 
encompassed in the Two Tiers scenario 
missed the more nuanced ways in which 
the private sector has made inroads into the 
New Zealand system. Examples included 
the quiet influx of corporate players 
into primary care as a way of managing 
increased demand through shared services, 
and the rise of private sector responses 
such as retirement villages in response 
to home care demands. Moreover, the 
ongoing tension between the marketing 
of some products and health promotion 
activities – for example, high levels of sugar 
in processed food and drink conflicting 
with efforts to reduce sugar intake – are 
further examples of the type of private–
public issue not anticipated in any scenario.
Health workforce underplayed 
Standing back, a key area that was missed in 
nearly all the scenarios was consideration 
of the health sector workforce, alongside 
a sense of how the structural power of 
the professions may hinder or enhance 
change. New occupational groups 
originating from nursing were anticipated 
to ‘fulfil the need for hybrid skill sets 
resulting from consumer demand’ 
(Muddling Through scenario). However, 
while the global nature of the workforce 
was acknowledged in the Positively 
Private and Global scenario, missed in 
all five scenarios were the challenges of 
an ageing general practice workforce, 
uneven distribution of the workforce 
between rural and urban areas of New 
Zealand, and the need to increase the 
number of Mäori students entering 
health science, medicine and other 
professional programmes. Surprisingly, 
and for reasons that are now lost in the 
mists of time, representatives from the 
professional colleges and other health 
workforce unions were not included in 
the list of workshop participants, which 
may explain why workforce issues were 
underplayed. Interestingly, the most 
extensive futures work that has been 
undertaken since the scenario exercise 
has been the work of Health Workforce 
New Zealand, which sought to build 
a picture of the health workforce in 
2020. This work involved assembling 
small groups of clinicians to assess the 
current situation in 15 specialised areas 
and provide recommendations for 
improvements.6 An attempt was made 
to partner conventional workforce 
planning approaches with foresight data 
to consider how the powers of different 
actors could potentially shape different 
professional futures (Rees et al., 2018).
It is not the job of a futures project to 
predict the future, but to challenge 
the assumption that the future can be 
forecast from known trends and will look 
a lot like the present. 
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How were the scenarios used?
Using criteria identified by Schoemaker 
(1993, 1995), the 1997 scenarios themselves 
were relevant, credible and coherent, 
but not particularly archetypal (this was 
intentional – they were designed to overlap 
each other). The process used was valuable 
in opening up decision makers’ minds to 
possibilities without them needing to feel 
threatened or defensive, but, given the New 
Zealand context, it could have been more 
inclusive. That said, the conundrum of a 
highly consultative process versus a ‘think 
tank’ approach cannot be resolved by a 
single evaluation. It may also be that the 
1997 scenarios did not have a long enough 
time frame, since there have been repeated 
nine-year swings of the political pendulum 
in New Zealand, with consequent changes 
of direction in the health system. A longer 
time frame would allow for ‘political 
swings and roundabouts’ to be treated as a 
factor to be considered in the development 
of robust strategy. 
In terms of impact on decision making, 
all interviewees remembered the 1997 
scenarios being talked about, albeit for a 
relatively short time before being overtaken 
by other developments. The initiative 
‘slipped away’ from decision makers’ fields 
of vision for a number of reasons: its 
discretionary nature, with no explicit 
follow-up required; it was time-bound 
rather than continuous – once finished it 
was out of sight and easily forgotten; and 
it was championed by a small group rather 
than the whole of senior management – a 
serious mistake (Wilkinson and Kupers, 
2014). It would be fair to say that if minds 
were opened up to the future, it was only 
for a short time. One respondent suggested 
that ‘scenario thinking is not a natural way 
of thinking’ and would take years to embed 
properly. Another pointed out that the 
scenarios were referred to in academic 
circles more so than in policy ones. 
Conclusion 
It is not the job of a futures project to 
predict the future, but to challenge the 
assumption that the future can be forecast 
from known trends and will look a lot 
like the present. This article considers 
the history of scenario development as a 
technique that enables a ‘whole system’ 
perspective and supports the design of 
effective policies and strategies in the face 
of uncertainty. 
We have also investigated what was 
learned from a process that set out two 
decades ago to help achieve better health 
outcomes for today’s New Zealanders. 
Many of the changes that emerged over 
those decades were inevitable and 
foreseeable, but others were surprising. 
Elements of all the 1997 scenarios have 
emerged, and the health system has 
responded as best it could. Perhaps it could 
have benefited from being more 
foresightful.
That said, we have been unable to 
determine whether the 1997 scenarios 
helped, or whether ‘better’ scenarios would 
have made a positive difference in the 
health sector. Hindsight leads us to 
conclude that any future scenario 
development project should be designed 
with evaluation in mind. It is especially 
important to establish baselines and 
continuously monitor impacts. 
Scenario development might be applied 
in other areas of public policy, particularly 
where there are seemingly intractable 
problems to be solved, or polarised views 
about future directions. Scenarios allow for 
the systematic development and description 
of alternative futures that are not ‘hard and 
fast’ and enable discussion to occur with 
the temperature turned down. Since 
elements of all scenarios are likely to 
emerge, there is no contest between them 
to be the winner, and the focus can shift to 
designing policies and strategies that will 
be relevant and robust, no matter what 
occurs. Scenarios complement traditional 
approaches rather than replace them, and 
allow for the desired whole-system 
perspective. 
There remains some contention about 
the best process for scenario development, 
and our future research will consider the 
experiences of other jurisdictions – for 
example, Singapore and Finland. However, 
New Zealand’s unique economic, social and 
cultural context clearly requires inclusivity 
rather than exclusivity – breadth as well as 
depth (Menzies and Middleton, 2019). This 
approach requires a judicious mix of 
independent research and expertise, 
representative advice, broad consultation, 
and communication of outcomes through 
multiple channels.
We also suggest that rather than being 
delegated and/or carried out during a 
discrete time period, scenario development 
should be embedded at the level of senior 
management as a continuous and 
constantly updated process. It is 
encouraging to see scenarios being used 
and refined in parts of the New Zealand 
public sector, but more work needs to be 
done to ensure that they mesh effectively 
with decision making. Hopefully, growth 
in use will continue, so that collectively we 
continue to bank experience and grow 
good practice.
1 These are scenarios that have been published or are still 
in the public domain. Anecdotally, the authors are aware 
of others having been developed by the Department of 
Conservation, Ministry for Primary Industries and Treasury. 
There are bound to be still others, along with scenario 
work that is more in the nature of option development or 
sensitivity analysis – all valuable but outside the scope of this 
article.
2 A charge also sometimes levelled at the Delphi technique.
3 Similar to the ‘mental models’ described by Johnson-Laird 
(1983).
4 Scenarios prepared for the transport sector challenged the 
assumption that demand could only increase and focused the 
debate on access instead, with considerable flow-on effects 
for urban design and land use. In health in the 1990s, 
it was assumed there would be continuous, successful 
growth in immunisation programmes (Longley and Warner, 
1995). Health professionals now know not to take this for 
granted, due in no small part to unanticipated developments 
such as some rogue research, resistance from an ‘anti-
vaxxer’ movement, and complacency due to the virtual 
disappearance of some diseases. 
5 Malcolm Menzies as a representative of the now-
disestablished New Zealand Futures Trust (see www.
futuretimes.co.nz); Lesley Middleton from the Ministry of 
Health.
6 See https://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/health-workforce/
workforce-service-forecasts. 
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